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By inverting Saez (2002)’s model of optimal income taxation, we characterize the 
redistributive preferences of the Irish government between 1987 and 2005. The (marginal) 
social welfare function revealed by this approach is consistently comparable over time and 
show great stability despite profound changes in market incomes and important fiscal reforms 
over the period. Results are robust to numerous checks regarding data, income concepts and 
elasticities. A comparison with the UK shows marked differences reflecting the narrow 
political spectrum in Ireland compared to radical changes in British politics over the past 30 
years. Some “anomalies” in the revealed social welfare function suggests introducing 
transfers to the working poor. 
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Following the seminal contributions of Mirrlees (1971) and various others, the normative
literature on optimal taxation has remained mostly theoretical for many years. The main
reason was the absence of reliable information on the ￿ true￿distribution of individual abil-
ities. More recently, the use of representative microdata has ￿lled the gap and allowed
implementing optimal tax models to question the optimality of actual tax-bene￿t sys-
tems.1 In addition to the distribution of abilities, there are two fundamental primitives
to such empirical applications which are related to e¢ ciency and equity concerns respec-
tively. One is the incentive compatibility constraint faced by government, which is often
summarized by the elasticity of labour supply (even though other margins may matter).
The other is the social aversion to inequality of a given population/government or more
generally the degree of curvature of the social welfare function. While the former object
can in principle be retrieved from econometric estimations, the latter, a representation of
social preferences, is a fundamental characteristic of a country at a certain point in time
and can become itself the subject of investigation.
More speci￿cally, given a country￿ s characteristics (wage distribution) and assump-
tion concerning elasticities, it is in principle possible to derive the optimal tax schedule
for di⁄erent assumptions about social preferences, and to identify the level of inequality
aversion for which optimal and actual tax schedules coincide.2 Interestingly, it is possible
to follow a somewhat dual approach. That is, the optimal tax model can be inverted
on actual e⁄ective tax rates to recover the implicit social welfare function that makes
the observed system optimal.3 This approach was ￿rst suggested in the context of opti-
mal commodity taxation (Stern, 1977, Christiansen and Jansen, 1978, Ahmad and Stern,
1984, Decoster and Schokkaert, 1989, Madden, 1996) or the regulation of utilities (Ross,
1984). It has been applied to optimal income taxation by Bourguignon and Spadaro
(2007) using Mirrlees￿model and data for France. Their initial objective was to charac-
1Of particular interest were the conditions under which con￿scatory levels of implicit taxation could
be justi￿ed at the bottom of the distribution, or, inversely, how new program of income maintenance,
like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US, could be grounded on the basis of optimal tax
formulas (see the discussions in Saez, 2002, and ChonØ and Laroque, 2005, among others). Also, an
exciting attempt to characterize the complete optimal tax schedule by numerical simulation is made by
Aarberge and Columbino (2008).
2This way, Laroque (2004) shows that an optimal schedule derived from rawlsian preferences is close
to the actual schedule in France and concludes about the relatively rawlsian nature of social preferences
in this country.
3By e⁄ective marginal tax rate, we understand the implicit tax on a marginal increment of income,
which accounts for the payment of income taxes and social contribution but also for the withdrawal of
means-tested bene￿ts as earnings increase.
1terize the properties of the implicit, tax-revealed social welfare function. Since Mirrlees￿
model accounts only for behavioural response at the intensive margin, Saez (2002) has
suggested a model incorporating both intensive and extensive margins at the cost of some
simpli￿cation, notably the discretization of the population into income groups. With this
setting, the inversion procedure can be easily applied to retrieve the set of social welfare
weights that rationalizes the existing tax-bene￿t system. Recently it has been adopted
for international comparisons of welfare regimes (for instance in Blundell et al., 2008).
Equally interesting, it may be applied to characterize the redistributive preferences
of a given country over time. This is the purpose of the present paper. We question
whether the (marginal) social welfare function revealed by this approach is consistently
comparable over time or re￿ ects changes in political forces. We focus on Ireland 1987-
2005, a place and time where radical changes a⁄ected both market incomes and tax-bene￿t
policies. We implement the inversion of Saez￿model for four years spanning this period
and focus on single individuals. Another contribution of the present study is to retrieve
the labour supply elasticities consistent with the data at use. While most studies postulate
reasonable values for elasticities (for instance Saez, 2002, Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2007,
Immervoll et al. 2007), we use a discrete choice model to estimate labour supply behaviour
and predict elasticities for each period and each income group.4
Results show a great stability in the tax-bene￿t revealed redistributive preferences
of the Irish government, despite a rapidly changing economic environment and radical
￿scal reforms.5 This result is consistent with a narrow political spectrum and a relatively
consensual society which guarantee certain continuity in political views. Under these
circumstances, the redistribution function based on the inverted optimal tax problem
may capture relatively well the nation￿ s true social preferences rather than the views of
the party in power. We suggest two extensions. Firstly, we focus on the working poor.
Results point to signi￿cant changes in relative preferences for this group but overall, the
social welfare weight received by this group is particularly low. As a result, the marginal
social welfare function is not monotonically decreasing. We show that the correction
of such "anomaly" justi￿es a transfer to the working poor that could be obtained by
a simple extension of the existing scheme (the Family Income Supplement). Secondly,
we provide similar characterization of redistributive preferences for the UK. This shows
4The link between optimal tax literature and the labour supply literature is nicely reviewed by Rłed
and Strłm (2002).
5Starting from a situation with a high tax burden in 1987, important and continuous tax cuts have
been carried out through increased tax bands and decreased tax rates. A policy of declining social
contribution rates has also been pursued. Social bene￿ts have been considerably raised in real terms at
the beginning and the end of the period.
2marked di⁄erences between the two countries, despite close cultural links. In contrast
to stable preferences in Ireland, large variations over time re￿ ect the radical changes in
British politics under the Thatcher government and again under New Labour.
Section 2 presents the optimal tax model. Section 3 describes the empirical imple-
mentation: the inversion procedure, sample selection, income concepts, the de￿nition of
income groups and estimated labour supply elasticities. Section 4 presents the Irish tax-
bene￿t system, its evolution since 1987 and the main results, i.e., the interpretation of
time variations in ￿scal policies over time in the light of changes in the social welfare
weights placed on the di⁄erent income groups. Section 5 reports the extensions including
paths to reform and a comparison with the UK. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Optimal Tax Model
The starting point of Saez (2002) is the standard optimal income tax model. A Paretian
government is assumed to maximize a social welfare function subject to an e¢ ciency
constraint and a national budget constraint. The social welfare function aggregates indi-
vidual utility levels, which themselves depend on disposable household income (equivalent
to consumption in a static framework) and leisure. The form of the social welfare function
characterizes the government￿ s taste for redistribution, ranging from rawlsian to utilitarian
preferences. Actual productivities are not observed so that the government can only rely
on second-best taxation based on incomes. The e¢ ciency constraint states that agents
modify their labour supply, and hence their taxable income, in response to the level of
e⁄ective taxation. Responses operate both at the extensive margin (participation deci-
sions) and the intensive margin (hours of work). In particular, high implicit taxes on the
most (least) productive ones may reduce their e⁄ort (participation) thereby reducing the
tax base. Only the intensive margin is considered in the original model of Mirrlees (1971)
while empirical evidence points toward an important e⁄ect of participation decisions (see
Heckman, 1993).
Based on this model, Saez (2002) aggregates individuals into I + 1 discrete groups
comprising I groups of individuals who do work, ranked by increasing gross income levels
Yi (i = 1;:::I), and a group consisting of those who do not work (group i = 0). One
implicit assumption in the model is that the property of agent monotonicity (Spence-
Mirrlees condition) is veri￿ed. In the present framework, it means that types 0 to I
are ranked according to productivity levels so that Yi increases with i. The proportion
hi measures the share of group i in the population. To each level of market income Yi
corresponds a level of consumption (disposable income) Ci = Yi ￿ Ti, where Ti is the
3e⁄ective tax paid by group i. Non-workers receive a transfer ￿T0 identical to C0 by














for i = 1;:::I: (1)
The left-hand side is the extra tax paid when moving from group i￿1 to group i, divided by
the gain in disposable income. In this expression, the information about social preferences
is summarized by gi, the weight assigned by the government to group i. This weight
mingles the ￿ pure￿social weight (the derivative of the implicit social welfare function
integrated over all the workers within this group) and the individuals￿marginal utility of
income. However, as argued by Saez (2002), it is preferably the object of our attention
because of its useful interpretation. Indeed it represents the (per capita) marginal social
welfare of transferring one euro to an individual in group i, expressed in terms of public
funds.
The e¢ ciency constraint is explicitly accounted for by the presence of two elasticities.
Individuals choose whether or not to participate (extensive margin) and which group to
choose (intensive margin). The intensive (or mobility) elasticity, ￿i, and the extensive













The mobility elasticity ￿i captures the percentage increase in group i when Ci ￿ Ci￿1 is
increased by 1%, and is de￿ned under the assumption that individuals are restricted to
adjust their labour supply to the neighbouring choice. This elasticity is di⁄erent from the
traditional wage-elasticity of worked hours which is de￿ned as the increase in working time
when wages increase by 1%. The participation elasticity ￿i is de￿ned as the percentage
of individuals in group i who stop working when the di⁄erence between the disposable
income out of work and at earnings point i is reduced by 1%.
Income e⁄ects are traditionally ignored in theoretical models of income taxation (often
based on quasi-linear preferences). When income e⁄ects are ruled out, an additional
constraint emerges from Saez (2002)￿ s model that normalizes weights as follows:6
X
i
higi = 1: (4)
6Including them substantially complicates the analysis (see Saez, 2002, Bourguignon and Spadaro,
2007), and the special benchmark case presented here can therefore be seen as an acceptable approxima-
tion.
4Empirical evidence generally supports this assumption (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
We also ￿nd very small income e⁄ects in our labour supply estimations and hence impose
this normalizing restriction which turns out to be useful for the inversion of the model,
as explained below.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Retrieving the Social Welfare Weights
We aim to invert the model to recover the (marginal) social welfare weights gi and ,
therefore, some information on the shape of the social welfare function (see Bourguignon
and Spadaro, 2007, for the original suggestion of this inversion procedure, initially in a
Mirrlees framework). While it is customary to compare ￿scal systems in terms of e⁄ective
average and marginal tax rates, degree of progressivity or degree of redistribution (e.g.,
change in Gini due to the impact of tax-bene￿t systems), this approach additionally
accounts for the e¢ ciency constraint faced by the government. For instance, low transfer
to the workless poor may be due to large participation elasticities rather than to low
taste for redistribution. Hence, this approach o⁄ers an original way of characterizing
tax-bene￿t systems and interpreting the usual available information directly in terms of
social welfare language / implicit redistributive preferences.
Using expression (1), it is straightforward to obtain:







for the last group and


















for groups i = 1;:::I ￿ 1, which allows us to derive recursively the weights gI to g1 using
observed incomes Yi, net taxes Ti and disposable incomes Ci. Finally, the weight g0 for
the inactive group is obtained using normalization (4).
3.2 Selection
The data at use are described in the Appendix ￿ our main results are based on the
Household Budget Surveys 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2005. We select potential salary workers
in the age range 18 ￿ 64 (i.e., exclude pensioners, student, farmers and self-employed).7
7The share of pro￿t versus wages is not observed and disposable income of self-employed are typically
under-reported.
5To keep up with the logic of the optimal tax model, we exclude all households where
capital income represents more than 25% of total gross income.
The treatment of the family composition in the optimal tax framework is a di¢ cult
task. The (unsatisfactory) solution adopted in almost all applications is to focus on one
homogenous demographic group at a time, implicitly assuming some separability between
intra- and inter-group redistribution.8 Most applications focus on one-adult households,
either single individuals or single mothers (for instance in Blundell et al., 2008). Very few
applications consider couples since it is not clear which labour supply elasticity should be
used (that of the ￿rst earner, of the second earner, a mixture, etc.) ￿to our knowledge,
only Haan and Navarro (2008) have tried to extent the present procedure to the case of
couples using a collective model.9
We follow the same path as previous studies and focus on single men and women
without children.10 While this restricts considerably the scope of the analysis, we still
capture the intentions of the planner in terms of vertical equity when looking at singles.
In other words, the extent to which rich singles are taxed (or poor single are compensated
by transfers) informs us about social preferences in the country. Note that there is no
particular reason to di⁄erentiate our analysis between men and women since there is no
gender-speci￿c tax/bene￿t treatment. Yet we account for gender di⁄erences in the labour
supply estimation. Di⁄erences in terms of labour supply elasticities are not signi￿cant.
3.3 Income Groups and Income Concepts
The de￿nition of the I + 1 groups in Saez￿model necessarily bears some arbitrariness in
the way the population is partitioned. This fact is hardly discussed in the literature (Saez,
2002, Blundell et al., 2008, Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2007). Since we aim to compare
social welfare weights in di⁄erent years, the problem becomes more accute and apparent
in our context. We ￿rst opt for a small number of income groups (I+1 = 6) which helps to
8Aggregating di⁄erent demographic groups in the same social welfare function poses fundamental
di¢ culties in terms of welfare comparisons and choices of equivalence scales. In particular, the chosen
equivalence scale should be that of the social planner herself and not "imposed from outside". One could
consider inverting the optimal tax model with demographic heterogeneity in order to retrieve the implicit
equivalence scale of the tax-bene￿t system, as suggested by Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003). However,
retrieving both social welfare weights and equivalence scales at the same time sounds challenging.
9The simpli￿cation used by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2007) in the framework of the Mirrlees model
is to treat multi-adult households as one entity with an "average" productivity and a common "e⁄ort"
supply (and hence a common elasticity). With less restrictive household representations and estimated
elasticities, the question of how to treat couples however remain. Immervoll et al. (2006) choose to
include all working-age individuals but ignore the joint decision process for those in couples.
10Sample sizes are too small to consider single mothers ￿a possible re￿ ection of the fact that divorce
was legalized recently in Ireland (the ￿rst divorces occurred in 1997).
6achieve meaningful comparisons over time (or across countries). By construction, group 0
is identi￿ed as the population with zero market income in the model (the ￿ idle poor￿ ). We
then suggest a baseline where the 5 other groups are simply quintiles of the (nonzero) gross
income distribution. In addition, we suggest a robustness check in the Appendix where
alternative de￿nitions are used ￿it reveals that the main results are not very sensitive to
the choice among reasonable partitioning.11
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Since the population is relatively
homogenous, we focus on the main ingredients of the model in this table, including the
levels of gross income Y and disposable income C per group and the group sizes. Since
our analysis focuses on the redistributive function of the government, the nature of the net
tax T = Y ￿ C deserves further explanations. It consists essentially of the main income
tax and payment of social contributions (PRSI) minus the bene￿ts received by single
individuals (Jobseekers Bene￿t/Allowance, Rent Allowance Supplement, Supplementary
welfare allowance). We discuss the Irish tax-bene￿t system more in detail in the Appendix
and summarize its main elements in Table 2.
Several comments can be made. Firstly, in Ireland (and the UK), the link between
the cost of contributions and the value of social insurance bene￿ts is not so strong, so
that it seems reasonable to treat contributory bene￿ts (and social security contributions)
as part of the state￿ s redistribution function. Also, rates of payment for social insurance
bene￿ts have moved very closely in line with those for social assistance bene￿ts. However,
further research should also consider alternative de￿nitions of the income concepts used
in the present approach. In particular, it is an open question as to what constitutes a
publicly provided social insurance based bene￿t or a state transfer (see Rochet, 1996, or
Borsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001, on the redistributive e⁄ects of health insurance and
pension contributions).12 Secondly, Table 1 shows the very rapid progression of labour
income levels over time and especially during the core of the "Celtic Tiger" economic
boom (second half of the 1990s). At the same time, we observe a decrease in the size of
group 0 also due to better economic conditions. Lastly, the di⁄erence between out-of-work
11Note that the mobility elasticity is dependent on how many groups there are (more groups make it
easier to move and hence the elasticity is larger). Yet note that in the optimal tax formula, the mobility
elasticity is weighted by the group size. If there are more groups, then mobility elasticities are larger but
some people move only ￿within the broader groups￿ . Also, we have tried alternative inversions with 11
rather than 6 groups and results are not fundamentally di⁄erent.
12In some countries, public pensions and unemployment bene￿ts are closely linked to workers￿past
earnings through social security contributions when active, and hence can be interpreted as delayed
salaries and more akin to private insurance (see the discussions in Bargain and Callan, 2008, Bourguignon,
1999).
7and in-work incomes is small for group 1. This is due to the fact that working poor are
excluded from any form of redistribution. Indeed they do not receive social transfers,
which are tapered away at a high rate, and in-work transfers do not exist for childless
singles. This can be seen in Table 1 where we calculate e⁄ective "marginal" tax rates
(Ti ￿ Ti￿1)=(Yi ￿ Yi￿1). Those are as high as 79% on group 1 (working poor) in 1994.
This will have important consequences on our results.
Table 1: Description of the Discretized Population of Single Individuals
Income Groups 1987 1994 1999 2005
Cut-off points (gross income)
1 138 149 252 387
2 203 249 392 580
3 269 375 554 780
4 395 513 732 1,114
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 77 81 158 257
2 177 207 328 486
3 233 302 468 680
4 326 439 634 917
5 553 704 978 1581
Disposable income Ci
0 55 79 105 157
1 82 96 168 275
2 144 184 270 427
3 178 236 368 548
4 228 313 462 711
5 359 471 685 1148
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate
1 64% 79% 60% 54%
2 38% 30% 40% 34%
3 40% 45% 30% 37%
4 45% 44% 44% 32%
5 42% 40% 35% 34%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.12
1 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
2 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
3 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
4 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
5 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
Notes: Group 0 = non-participants. Other groups: income quintiles among
participants. All incomes in Euro per week
83.4 Labour Supply Elasticities
Labour supply estimation and the method used to predict elasticities are described in
the Appendix. We have calculated "standard" income and wage elasticities to provide a
comparison with the empirical literature, as well as the speci￿c elasticities ￿i and ￿i used
in the optimal tax model and de￿ned in expressions (2) and (3). Results go as follows.
We ￿nd very small income elasticities, around ￿0:02, which are not signi￿cantly dif-
ferent from zero. Traditional wage elasticities of hours and participation are in line with
the empirical literature (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), around 0:35 in the 1990s
and signi￿cantly smaller in 2005 (around 0:10). This decline is consistent with increased
labour force participation over time (this trend is documented by Heim, 2007, for the
US). Speci￿c results for Ireland exist in the literature but usually focus on couples. It
is nonetheless worth reporting these results for married men since their elasticities are
usually not very di⁄erent from those of single individuals. This is indeed the case in
these Irish studies: 0:15 (Callan and van Soest, 1996), 0:25 (Callan et al., 2009) and 0:11
(Bargain and Doorley, 2009) using data for years 1987, 1995 and 2000 respectively.
For the year 2005, we ￿nd Saez￿participation elasticities around 0:20 in low-income
groups and 0:12 in high income groups. This is relatively comparable to Blundell et al.
(2008), who report a range of 0:08 ￿ 0:28 (0:08 ￿ 0:18) for the UK (Germany), even if
these authors focus on single mothers, a group with traditionally lower participation rates
and larger elasticities. Nevertheless, these are very moderate elasticities which are in
line with the above evidence on the size of more conventional measures of labour supply
responsiveness. For previous years, we ￿nd larger elasticities, from 0:5 ￿ 0:6 in groups 1
and 2 down to 0:4 for higher income groups, which is in line with the time trend discussed
above. By de￿nition, mobility elasticities are identical to participation elasticities for
group 1. We ￿nd moderate sizes for higher income groups, from 0:3 for group 2 to 0:1
higher up in the income distribution in the 1990s and smaller in 2005.
Note that the optimal tax rule in (1) depends heavily on whether labour supply re-
sponses are concentrated at the intensive or extensive margin. When the extensive elas-
ticity is assumed to be zero, the model boils down to a discrete version of Mirrlees￿
model and gives identical results. In particular, negative marginal tax rates resulting
from in-work transfers (like the EITC in the US) are never optimal since they discourage
productive workers at the intensive margin. However, the larger the extensive elasticity,
the more likely are optimal schedule featuring smaller guaranteed income for non-workers
and larger in-work support, with possibly negative marginal taxes at low income levels
(see Saez, 2002, ChonØ and Laroque, 2005). Present results, as in Blundell et al. (2008),
9point to larger responses at the extensive margin. As a matter of fact, Ireland and the
UK operate in-work transfers to the working poor, in the form of the Family Income
Supplement and the Working Tax Credit respectively, but not for single individuals (only
starting 2003 in the UK). We discuss this point more extensively below and suggest paths
to reform.
4 Tax-Bene￿t Revealed Social Preferences
4.1 Political and Economic Context
Since our objective is to interpret the tax-bene￿t developments in light of the redistributive
intentions of the government, it is good to ￿rst recall the economic and political context
of the period under investigation. In terms of politics, Ireland has been characterised by
relative stability over the period of our analysis: Fianna Fail has been in power either
alone or through coalitions since its return to government in 1987 except for the period
December 1994-June 1997 when a coalition including the second largest party, Fine Gael,
along with Labour and the Democratic Left were in power. More generally, the political
spectrum in Ireland is relatively narrow: the two main parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael,
represent the vast majority of the electorate and both lie towards the centre of the political
spectrum. This political context thus conveys that the social preferences exhibited in our
results are not due to individual party preferences but a fair representation of "average"
redistributive preferences in the nation. As will be shown, the British context is radically
di⁄erent.
The Irish economy over the period under investigation has experienced rapid and
important changes. The di¢ cult economic situation of the 1980s was characterized by
high public debt and high unemployment. The Fine Gael government managed to stabilise
the public ￿nances but did not succeed in curbing unemployment which reached 17% by
1987. Nonetheless, public ￿nance stabilisation meant that at its return to power, Fianna
Fail had more ￿ exibility with regard to ￿scal policy. The second half of the 1990s has been
characterized by an unprecedented period of economic growth (average annual growth rate
of 6.5%), the "Celtic tiger" era, and a sharp decline in unemployment that had already
started in the early 1990s (from nearly 17 % in 1987 down to 14 % in 1994 and just above
4% over the ￿rst half of the 2000s).
104.2 Tax-Bene￿t Policy Changes over 1987-2005
With this context in mind, we can interpret the tax-bene￿t policy developments since
1987. The main changes in tax and bene￿t parameters are reported in Table 2 in the
Appendix, with all monetary ￿gures in real terms (2005 Euros). As suggested above,
policy changes re￿ ect more the spirit of the time and a pragmatic management of economic
circumstances than any radical political change. Crucially, 1987 saw the beginning of a
￿social partnership￿process, with centralised bargaining between unions, employers and
government on pay and on wider policy issues such as tax and welfare. In return for
relatively modest wage increases the government committed itself to relaxing spending
cuts (thus increasing public sector employment), taking actions to increase private sector
employment and reforming the tax system (Programme for National Recovery, 1987).13
While taxes had remained high in the 1980s, the result of this agreement was the abolition
of the top marginal tax rate (58%) and a reduction in the standard tax rate (from 35%
to 27%) by 1994. While tax thresholds were relatively low by today￿ s standard, we
observe a substantial increase after 1994. The 1987-1994 period was also characterized by
substantial increases in certain social welfare rates.14 Hence the 1987-1994 period seems
characterized by substantial redistribution towards the lower and upper end of the income
distribution via increases in social welfare rates and tax cuts (see Callan and Nolan, 1999).
The aforementioned social partnership compromise carried on in the following periods
with a widening of the tax bands and continuous reductions in income tax rates and social
insurance rates. As reported in Table 2, the standard tax rate declined from 27 to 20%
and the higher tax rate from 48% to 42% over 1994-2005. On the bene￿t side, however,
social welfare rates stagnated in real terms between 1994 and 1999. As a result, several
studies show that the middle and upper end of the income distribution progressed more
rapidly than the poorest over the period (Nolan et al., 2000, ch. 10, Nolan and Maitre,
2000). In fact, while inequality decreased during this time thanks to the dramatic change
in the Irish economy and in particular the fall in unemployment ￿see Gini coe¢ cients
in Table 2 ￿the contribution of policy changes was to increase inequality (Bargain and
Callan, 2008).
During the 2000-2005 period, the positive economic situation and declining unemploy-
ment rates meant that tax cuts could continue while a large increase in Unemployment
13Note that the fact that wage rates may depend on tax rates is not accounted for in the optimal tax
model.
14This was initiated by the harmonisation of bene￿t rates in response to recommendations by the
Commission on Social Welfare (1986). In particular a substantial increase in unemployment bene￿t and
unemployment allowance occurred (29% increase in real terms) ￿ these bene￿ts had been left below
bene￿t average in the past and caught up particularly on old age state pensions.
11Bene￿t was more easily a⁄ordable ￿we report a 15% increase in real terms in Table 2.
Redistributive intentions were already announced in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy
(NAPS), with a set of measures to ensure that "that the impact of very rapid economic,
social and demographic change reduces social inequalities and social polarisation.....(and)
that the bene￿ts of social economic management and growth are distributed fairly" (Com-
bat Poverty Agency, 2001).
4.3 Characterizing Social Preferences
Overall, it seems that the Irish government has achieved important ￿scal reforms over the
period under study. Yet, since the period has been characterized by important changes
in market income, it is a priori di¢ cult to know if the government has favoured some
income groups in this redistribution process or has simply ensured that the rising tide
indeed lifted all the boats. The results of the inverted optimal tax approach should shed
some new light on this question.
We ￿rst present the social welfare weights as derived from the above methodology and
using average estimated elasticities over all periods (Figure 1). The pattern of (marginal)
social welfare weights derived from this exercise displays reasonable properties. A neces-
sary condition for the implicit social welfare function to be Paretian, i.e., non-decreasing
at all productivity levels, is that weights be positive. We ￿nd that it is the case here,
even if weights on working poor are very small. The pattern is also consistent with some
social aversion to inequality, with the largest social weight placed on the poorest (group
0). This naturally translates the e⁄ect of transfers at the bottom and the progressivity
of the tax system for higher incomes. Yet the marginal social welfare function is not
monotonically decreasing with income groups (i.e., the social welfare function is not con-
cave at all income levels). It is relatively ￿ at for the top 3 groups, re￿ ecting little taste
for redistribution among the richest, and shows a pronounced dip for group 1 (and to
some extent for group 2), which is due to very high implicit marginal tax rates on the
working poor and rationalized in the optimal tax model by small social welfare weights.
It is all the more so as participation elasticities are high ￿in that case, the e¢ ciency
cost of maintaining generous transfers to the workless poor but no in-work transfers to
the working poor is necessarily higher and can only be justi￿ed in the model by placing
relatively high weights on the former and small weights on the latter.15 A "correction"
15This result is not speci￿c to Ireland but a common feature to many European countries with means-
tested transfers to the workless poor. Because of means-testing bene￿ts at the bottom of the skill
distribution and progressive taxation at the top, a U-shaped distribution of e⁄ective marginal tax rates
is often encountered in industrialized countries. Many authors have tried to justify this pro￿le by means
12of the social welfare function can be naturally suggested and takes the form of in-work
support for (childless) single individuals ￿see next section.
Replicating the procedure for di⁄erent years allows us to characterize time variations
in tax-bene￿t revealed social preferences. The striking result in Figure 1 is that despite
important tax-bene￿t reforms and rapid economic changes that occurred over the period,
the marginal social welfare function looks very stable over time. While the di⁄erences
in levels observed for groups 2-5 over time seem marginal, the only signi￿ciant change
that we can witness concerns groups 0 and 1 (see con￿dence interval analysis in the
Appendix). The absolute weight on group 0 in Figure 1 re￿ ects the strong increase in
real terms of social bene￿ts between 1987 and 1994 and between 1999 and 2005 (and real-
term stagnation over 1994-1999). Group 1 is not concerned by the redistributive policy
at the two extremes of the distribution occurring between 1987 and 1994 (tax cuts at
the top and increase in unemployment bene￿ts for the non-participants), which explains
the signi￿cant drop in its social welfare weight in 1994. This is partly corrected in the
following years since the working poor bene￿t from an extension of the tax-free bracket
(its upper threshold increases by 30% in real terms between 1994 and 2000) and become
exempt from social contribution (the upper limit for PRSI exemption increases from EUR
128 to 378 in real terms between 1994 and 2000), as described in Table 2.
Naturally, some of these results can be a⁄ected if we account for the changes in elas-
ticities. In fact, average elasticities used in Figure 1 are very close to the estimated values
for years 1994 and 1999. Yet variations in elasticities for 1987 and 2005 a⁄ect the results
for these two years, as can be seen in Figure 2. Slightly larger elasticities in 1987 lead
to a higher weight on group 0 (and lower weights on other groups) since redistribution
is more costly in e¢ ciency terms. Di⁄erences are very small nonetheless. For year 2005,
much smaller elasticities and hence lower e¢ ciency costs of the redistributive system in
force that year means that weights on the workless poor must be lower than previously
found (and weights higher up in the distribution larger). This way, the boost in transfers
occurring in the 2000s and commented above does not denote a change in redistributive
tastes but simply the fact that redistributing became easier as the e¢ ciency constrained
is relaxed.
Note that the elasticities used here are consistent with the data ￿which we (and
Blundell et al., 2008) have motivated as a contribution of our work compared to posited
of an optimal tax framework (see Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001, for the US, Piketty, 1997, Bourguignon and
Spadaro, 2000, ChonØ and Laroque, 2005, for France, among others). Yet the social welfare function that
could justify such pro￿le, given that responses are mainly at the extensive margin, exhibits irregularities


































Figure 1: Social Welfare Weights, Baseline (HBS, Cuto⁄s based on quintiles)
or calibrated elasticities in the past literature. Yet, nothing guarantees that they coincide
with the representation of the e¢ ciency constraint that Irish policy makers have. Even if
they did, we only account for labour supply responses while other margins a⁄ecting the
tax base exist (work e⁄ort, tax evasion, etc., see Feldstein, 1995, or Goolsbee, 2000, among
others). In this situation, suggesting a sensitivity analysis based on high/low elasticity
scenarios remains a sensible option. In the robustness analysis presented in the Appendix,
we essentially suggest using the bounds of the estimated 95% con￿dence interval to check
the sensitivity of our results to elasticity size.
5 Extensions
5.1 Reshaping the Irish Fiscal System
The previous characterization of the changes in tax-bene￿t policies shows that the high
implicit taxation of the working poor has been reduced over time ￿with a notable increase
in the corresponding social welfare weight. Yet that weight remains smaller than for most
groups. In Figure 3, we suggest a simple "correction" of the marginal social welfare func-


























































* with constant elasticities over time
Figure 2: Social Welfare Weights, Year-speci￿c Elasticities (HBS, Cuto⁄s based on quin-
tiles)
15social welfare function monotonically decreasing all along. In addition, we impose mean-
ingful constraints, namely revenue neutrality and the fact that transfers to group 0 cannot
be reduced. After some experimentation, we have found that these constraints ￿and the
fact that social welfare weights are interdependent ￿considerably reduce the number of
solutions to this problem. The solution we have reached numerically is not unique but
other reforms would depart only very marginally from this one. The result is represented
in the left panel of Figure 3.
The corresponding reform is achieved by a transfer to the working poor ￿of around
EUR 60 per week for workers in group 1 ￿￿nanced by a progressive increase in taxation
for higher income levels. It results in an increase of disposable incomes of groups 1, 2 and
3 by 17%, 10% and 1% respectively, and a decrease in disposable incomes of groups 4
and 5 by 6% and 7% respectively. The impact of the reform on the budget constraints of
single individuals is represented in the right panel of Figure 3. The hump generated by the
reform for weekly gross incomes around EUR 250-500 (groups 1 and 2) is very similar to
those obtained when simulating the hypothetical impact of the British working tax credit
in Ireland or an extension of the existing in-work bene￿t, the Family Income Supplement,
to childless households (see Bargain and Doorley, 2009). Thus a consistent adjustment of
the Irish social welfare function would justify the implementation of such reforms. Note
that many European systems are characterized by the same "anomaly" concerning the
working poor ￿as a matter of fact, many of these countries have undertaken this type of
reform by implementing individualized in-work transfers.16
5.2 An International Comparison
We have produced similar results for the UK using the Family Expenditure Survey ￿this
data set allows us to cover a slighly larger period than for Ireland, i.e., to include the
pre-Thatcher situation (see the data section in the Appendix). Elasticities are drawn
from Bargain et al. (2010).
Institutions in the two countries share some similarities and many policies have been
labelled in the same way at certain periods. For instance, the Family Income Supplement
in force in Ireland was the old system of in-work transfer in the UK, before family tax
credits were implemented. Yet the political context is radically di⁄erent, with a broader
16This includes earned income tax credit in France and the Netherlands (see Stancanelli, 2008) and
exemptions of social security contributions for low-wage earners in Belgium or Germany (see Steiner


































































Figure 3: "Correcting" the Redistributive Function
political spectrum and marked ideological constrasts between the two largest parties, the
Conservatives and the Labour party.17
The marginal social welfare function for the UK is represented in Figure 4. If we
consider year 2005, the overall pattern is very similar to the Irish one, with highest
weights on group 0 and a ￿ at curve for the rest of the income distribution. The levels are
also similar, with weights on higher income groups at about a third of that on group 0.
However, the time variation is striking. The situation in 1979, with extremely high
marginal tax rates set by ￿ Old Labour￿ , ties in with the extremely low weights placed
on taxpayers in upper income groups ￿ the most Rawlsian situation observed in our
results. In the following period, the very important tax cuts implemented by the Thatcher
government are particularly visible, with the extreme jump in the social weights on higher
income groups.18 Finally, the patterns for 1999 and 2005 show modest variations compared
to the Conservative era. At the time Labour believed that removing ambiguity with
regards to taxation policy was crucial if Labour were to succeed in gaining power. The
17Labour were in power since 1974 then lost the 1979 election to the Conservatives. The ￿ New Right￿
era saw the application of the Thatcherism political ideology. Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister
for 11 years before losing the party leadership to John Major. Labour won the 1997 general election and
Tony Blair took over as Prime Minister for 10 years.
18Under ￿ Old Labour￿11 tax rates existed of which the top tax rate was 83%. Upon the return to a
Conservative government, the number of tax rates was reduced to 6 and top marginal tax rates were cut.
A further consolidation occurred in 1988, creating a system with just two tax rates 25% and 40%, hence
another radical tax cut.
17top tax rate was not changes and in 1999, the basic rate of tax was halved to 10%.19
In e⁄ect, we see little change concerning top incomes. At the same time, New Labour
developped an extensive redistributive policy but only part of it can be observed here
￿with some increases in the weights of group 0 ￿since we focus on single individuals
(the 1999 extension of tax credits targeted to the working poor and the boost in income
support a⁄ected mainly families with children and pensioners, cf. Riddell, 2008).
The comparison between Figures 1 and 4 is striking. Huge variations occurred in
the UK as a result of changes in government. In contrast, we have observed very stable
social preferences in Ireland, consistent with the relative political stability in this coun-
try and, more fundamentally, a broad social consensus (it is likely that more frequent
changes of majority would have led to the same result). To characterize this contrast, we
parameterize the marginal social welfare weights as suggested by Saez (2002):
gi = 1=(p ￿ Ci)
￿ (7)
where p denotes the marginal value of public funds and ￿ is a scalar parameter re￿ ecting
the social aversion to inequality. The higher ￿, the higher the redistributive tastes of the
government (￿ = +1 corresponds to the Rawlsian criterion while ￿ = 0 corresponds to
utilitarian preferences). Using the values of gi obtained by inversion of the optimal tax
model, we estimate the log of expression (7) to recover the parameter ￿ for each country
and each point in time. Results are presented in Figure 5. Clearly, tax-bene￿t revealed
social aversion to inequality remains constant over time in Ireland, while it strongly de-
creases with the ￿rst Conservative government and gradually increases afterwards. ￿ New
Labour￿indicating a move away from its traditional left-wing position to a more centre-
left approach, it may not be surprising to witness a relative convergence between the two
countries in the recent period.
It would be interesting to compare our results ￿which could be interpreted as some
form of revealed preferences ￿to alternative, more direct measures of redistributive pref-
erences. In the political economy literature, some surveys attempt to measure people￿ s
attitude toward inequality, for example the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
used in Corneo and Gr￿ner (2002).20 These authors focus on a question about "whether it
is the responsibility of the government to reduce di⁄erences in income between people with
19"The justice for me is concentrated on lifting incomes of those that don￿ t have a decent income. It￿ s
not my ambition to make sure that David Beckham earns less money" (Tony Blair, 2001).
20Also in behavioural economics, experiments are conducted to assess preferences of a group (see for
instance Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In the public economic literature, implicit value judgments may be

















Results based on FES for all years except 2004/5 using EFS
Figure 4: Social Welfare Weights for the UK (FES/EFS, Cuto⁄s based on quintiles)
high incomes and those with low incomes". It does not perfectly identify redistributive
preferences but this is the closest we could ￿nd in the ISSP to capture the redistributive
and interventionist view of the society. We retrieve this question for Ireland and the UK
and form a binary variable (￿ yes￿is De￿nitely should be or Probably should be, ￿ no￿is
Probably should not be or De￿nitely should not be). For the UK, the proportion of ￿ yes￿is
0:74 in the 80s, 0:67 in 1996 and 0:69 in 2006. For Ireland, it is 0:81 (1990), 0:78 (1996)
and 0:79 (2006). Interestingly, there are common points with the (tax-bene￿t) revealed
preferences derived in this paper: (1) redistributive tastes are higher in Ireland, (2) they
are more stable in this country, (3) we observe a decline in inequality aversion in the
UK ￿which is in fact delayed compared to the implementation of Thatcherian policies.
The latter point seems to show that institutions, or policy makers, once in place, can
in￿ uence social preferences. The in￿ uence of policy makers/institutions on the society,
and the reverse causality through social choice, have received attention recently ￿see the
review of Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and the e⁄ect of political regimes in Alesina and









































Figure 5: Social Aversion to Inequality: Ireland vs UK
6 Conclusion
Inverting the optimal tax model suggested by Saez (2002), we characterize the redistrib-
utive preferences embodied in the Irish tax-bene￿t system over the period 1987-2005. To
account for the e¢ ciency constraint faced by the social planner, we estimate labour sup-
ply elasticities for each income group and each period. The Appendix provides numerous
checks including alternative sizes for elasticities, alternative income sources and measures
of disposable income (either survey-based or simulated by a tax-bene￿t calculator) and
alternative de￿nitions of the income groups. Results show a great stability of social prefer-
ences in Ireland, despite a rapidly changing economic environment and radical tax-bene￿t
reforms. This is consistent with a narrow political spectrum and a relatively consensual
society ￿and in complete contrast to the situation in the UK. Radical changes in British
politics coincide with rapid changes in the implicit redistributive tastes revealed by the
tax-bene￿t system. In Ireland, in-work ￿nancial support to the working poor is advocated
as a consistent "correction" of the tax-bene￿t revealed redistributive function.
We acknowledge several limitations of our analysis. Firstly, the redistributive function
of the government characterized in our framework is incomplete. Other direct or indirect
20taxes as well as non-cash bene￿ts could be incorporated and may prove important, at
least to the extent that they a⁄ect di⁄erent income groups di⁄erently.21 Including these
di⁄erent components may change the social welfare pattern but not necessarily the time
trend and the sharp contrast across countries revealed in the present analysis. Secondly,
the scope of the analysis was limited to childless single individuals. As noted in the text, it
is in principle possible to replicate the analysis on di⁄erent (demographically homogenous)
groups. In particular, looking at couples would show more variations in tax-bene￿t policies
over time. The di¢ culties to incorporate couples￿joint labour supply decisions in an
optimal tax framework have been discussed in the text. Thirdly, it is also complicated to
account for other margins along which households may response to changes in tax-bene￿t
policies. Some authors have nonetheless considered migration and tax evasion (see Simula
and Trannoy, 2006) or changes in "productive e⁄ort" (see Feldstein, 1995). Finally, in the
Saez model, non-participating individuals do so because of low net wages. Involuntary
unemployment is not present, which may bias the elasticities at the extensive margin and
the interpretation of the results ￿further work is de￿nitely needed in this direction.
Another set of comments concern the more fundamental nature of the exercise. Firstly,
and arguably, the analysis used in the present paper may neither capture the "true" social
preferences of a population nor the redistributive taste of the government in place. The
political forces that shape tax systems are certainly more complex and involve other
dimensions (labour market policies, wage negotiations, etc.) and numerous actors (social
partners, lobbies, etc.). Yet, the Irish and British cases analyzed in this paper seem to
provide two contrasted, maybe polar, cases. The stability of the redistributive function
in Ireland conveys that the approach reveals something relatively close to the nation￿ s
social consensus. The British example seems to re￿ ect more the redistributive function
of the party in power. Secondly, social preferences are clearly not exogenous nor stable.
They a⁄ect the nature of governments and the policy making process, while institutions
probably a⁄ect in turn the redistributive preferences of a nation. A lot of research will be
needed to disentangle these aspects. The present approach was a way of characterizing
"tax-bene￿t revealed social preferences" at certain points in time and space but certainly
21In particular, property taxation in the form of stamp duties has played an important role in Ireland
during the Celtic Tiger period. Indirect taxation could also be incorporated in the analysis (it was
increased in the UK under Thatcher), even if its redistributive role is usually meagre (see Sah, 1983,
and Madden, 1995, in the Irish context). An extension of the present inverted optimal tax approach
to non-cash bene￿ts has been suggested with an application for Germany by Haan and Wrohlich (2007)
while Callan and Keane (2008) study the redistributive impact of in-kind transfers in Ireland. Finally, the
redistribution e⁄ect of public health and education systems should also be investigated (see the formal
analysis of Besley and Coate, 1991).
21not an attempt to explain where they come from.22 Thirdly and lastly, the present
characterization made use of the ￿ction of a maximizing and Paretian social planner. It
could be interesting to replicate this type of exercise with non-welfarist objectives and/or
have welfarist objectives (see Ooghe and Peichl, 2010, and Kanbur et al., 2006).
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Appendix
Data and Tax/Bene￿t Variables
The fundamental information required by the model is the level of market income Yi and
the set of taxes and transfers aggregated into a net tax Ti (or, equivalently, disposable
income Ci) for each income group i. These di⁄erent pieces of information are typically
provided in household surveys. It is not always possible to obtain comparable information
over time, as variable de￿nitions or methods to calculate sample weights change from one
wave of data to the next. For the present paper, we have relied essentially on the Irish
Household Budget Survey (HBS) that provides consistent and comparable information
for years 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2005, with around 7,000 households per wave. Similarly
for the UK, we use the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) that is available from 1974 to
2001 and contains a bit less than 7,000 households per year. We choose similar points
in time, with some small di⁄erences aimed to capture the interesting changes in British
politics. Hence we make use of the 1979, 1988, 1994 and 1999 waves, as well as the 2005
wave of the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) that replaced FES after 2001.
26The robustness analysis below relies on alternative datasets and methods to retrieve
information on taxes and transfers in Ireland. This includes the Living in Ireland Survey
(LII), a representative panel dataset of the Irish population available from 1994 to 2001.
The LII is small (around 4,000 households per year) and the attrition makes that the
sample loses some of its representativeness in the later years, despite the addition of a
"refreshment" sample in years 2000-01. For the more recent period, an obvious choice is
the Irish wave of the EU￿ s Standards in Income and Living Conditions survey (SILC) of
the year 2005.23
Alternatively to information on taxes and bene￿ts as provided in the data, it is pos-
sible to use ￿scal microsimulation to calculate theoretical taxes/bene￿ts concerning each
household. Relying on microsimulation ￿rst avoids the problem of misreported taxes or
bene￿ts and hence possible measurement errors in disposable income. Reported taxes
and bene￿ts may also re￿ ect tax evasion and non-take-up, respectively. This is usually
not modelled in microsimulation because the necessary information to account for it is
lacking. Bene￿ts which are not claimed could represent a failure of the government to
reach intended recipients. In that case, one may argue that theoretical disposable income
obtained by microsimulation is a more faithful representation of the initial redistributive
intention of the government. However, partial take-up can also be caused voluntarily by
the government, through administrative complexity and hassle (see Kleven and Kopczuk,
2008). Since it is di¢ cult to conclude, a sensible approach consists simply in compar-
ing our results when disposable income Ci is either directly taken from the data (and
hence re￿ ecting possible measurement errors, bene￿t non-take-up and tax evasion) or
microsimulated.24
Irish Tax-Bene￿t System
This description refers to parameters summarized in Table 2. Since we focus on working
age single individuals, we do not report other bene￿ts, like those targeted at households
with children or pensioners.
The Irish income taxation system is relatively simply, with only two marginal rates
(20% and 40%) in the recent period and a tax-free bracket obtained by use of tax al-
23For the early period, we could use the ancestor of the LII, the 1987 Survey of Income Distribution,
Poverty and Usage of State Services (IDPU) maintained by the ESRI, which is a nationwide strati￿ed,
clustered random sample drawn from the Electoral Register. After a careful examination, we came to
the conclusion that the IDPU was not readily comparable to later data sources.
24This is not done using our own tax-bene￿t calculations but using a precise microsimulation model
for Ireland, SWITCH (Simulating Welfare and Income Tax Changes).
27lowances or tax credits. Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) contributions are made by
both the employer and employee. In 2005, PRSI is made up of a social insurance element
(which goes towards payment of social welfare bene￿ts in the Social Insurance Fund) and
a health contribution which goes directly to the Department of Health and Children to
fund health services. These are two ￿ at rates of 4% and 2% respectively for the year 2005.
Under a certain income limit (EUR 364 per week in 2005), employees do not have to pay
the social insurance element but remain covered. An earning ceiling (EUR 847 per week
in 2005) also exists above which a cap is placed on the social insurance element.
Social welfare bene￿ts in Ireland are divided into two main types, contributory and
non-contributory. Entitlement to contributory bene￿ts is dependent upon having an ad-
equate number of social insurance contributions made by workers during employment.
The main social welfare bene￿t available to single people is the Jobseekers Bene￿t (JB),
previously known as Unemployment Bene￿t (basic amount of EUR 149 per week in 2005).
This bene￿t is not means-tested and can only be received for up to a maximum continu-
ous period of 12 months. It may be kept for work on a very temporary basis or in case
of forced job-sharing (and is received on a pro-rata basis in this case). Claimants who
have exhausted their 12-month entitlement to JB or have not contributed enough to be
eligible can apply for the means-tested bene￿t known as Jobseekers Allowance (previously
Unemployment Allowance). The basic amount is identical to the JB and the means-test
includes incomes of all other family members. Finally, a Rent Allowance Supplement is
payable to those whose only income is from social welfare and ensures that an individual
income after paying rent does not fall below a certain level. Other bene￿ts exist for spe-
cial circumstances, including the Carers Allowance, the Mortgage Interest Supplement,
the Disabled Persons Maintenance Allowance, the Deserted Wives Bene￿t and the Lone
Parent Allowance, but most of them do not a⁄ect the childless single individuals in our
selection. The taper rate of most of these bene￿ts is as high as 100% leading to high
implicit marginal tax rates on earnings.
Labour Supply Estimations and Simulation of Elasticities
We rely on a discrete choice model of labour supply (multinomial logit) estimated by
simulated maximum likelihood. The approach has become relatively standard and hence
we simply refer to Aaberge et al. (1995), van Soest (1995) and Blundell et al. (2000).
Nonetheless we summarize here the choices made to estimate the model and to predict
elasticities. Following Blundell et al. (2000), we specify consumption-leisure preferences
using a quadratic form so that the deterministic part of the utility of a person i choosing
28Table 2: Taxation, Social Insurance and Social Welfare System: Ireland 1987-2005
1987 1994 1999 2005
Number of tax brackets* 3 2 2 2
Standard tax rate 35% 27% 22% 20%
Higher tax rate 48% 48% 44% 42%
Top tax rate 58% - - -
Lower bounds of tax brackets: **
Standard rate bracket @ 162 140 183 273
Higher rate bracket @ 418 475 728 694
Top rate bracket @ 571 - - -
Rate % (employee, private sector) 6.0% 5.5% 4.5% 4.0%
Income Ceiling  @ 843 853 850 847
Income Exemption Limit  @ - 128 378 364
Health Levy 1.3% 1.3% 2.0% 2.0%
Employment and Training Levy 1.0% 1.0% - -
Unemployment Benefit / Allowance
@
120 130 130 149
change in real terms (wage inflation) 8% 0% 15%
change in real terms (price inflation) 23% 4% 14%











@ Tax thresholds and benefit payments are in real terms (2005 Euro, adjusted using the CSO's Average Industrial
Wage Index)




** Thresholds on weekly income. The 0% income range corresponds to a system of tax allowances for year 1987-2001
and by tax credits from 2002 onwards.
Income  Taxation
* Exclude the zero-rate bracket
29the discrete choice j = 1;:::J can be written:
Uij = ￿ciCij + ￿ccC
2
ij + ￿hiHij + ￿hh(Hij)
2 + ￿chCijHij ￿ Fij:
with household consumption Cij and worked hours Hij. In this expression, coe¢ cients
on consumption and worked hours, namely ￿ci and ￿hi, vary linearly with several taste-
shifters (gender, polynomial form of age, region). They also incorporate random com-
ponents so the model allows for unobserved heterogeneity and unrestricted substitution
patterns between alternatives. The ￿t is improved by the addition of ￿xed costs of work
Fij, expressed here in utility metric, which capture the fact that there are very few ob-
servations with a small positive number of working hours.
We make use of a simple discretization with J = 4 (choices are 0;20;40 and 50 hours
per week). We have checked that thinner discretizations do not a⁄ect the size of elasticities
signi￿cantly. Consumption (equivalent to disposable income in a static framework) is
calculated as a function Cij = D(wiHij; yi) of labour income wiHij for each discrete
hour choice and non-labour income yi. The function D is approximated by numerical
simulation of tax and bene￿t rules in force at each point in time (see Table 2). Wages wi
are calculated using earnings and work hours for workers and predicted for non-workers.
Because the model is nonlinear, we take the wage rate prediction errors explicitly into
account for a consistent estimation. Both types of disturbance terms (random preferences
and the wage error term) are integrated out in the likelihood, practically by summing
over a tractable number of draws (see Train 2003).
We have calculated several types of elasticities, including "standard" income and wage
elasticities and the particular elasticities used in the optimal tax model, as de￿ned in ex-
pressions (2) and (3). In the present non-linear model, labour supply elasticities cannot
be derived analytically but it is possible to rely on numerical simulation, i.e., to uniformly
increase non-labour income or wage rates marginally and to simulate labour supply re-
sponses. We follow a calibration method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature
of the model at the individual level. It consists of drawing a set (here 200 draws) of J +1
random terms from an EV ￿ I distribution for each household that generates a perfect
match between predicted and observed choices. The same draws are kept when predicting
labour supply responses to a shock on wages or non-labour income Averaging individual
supply responses over a large number of draws provides robust transition matrices.25
Mobility and participation elasticities used in the optimal tax model are produced for
each group i = 1;::I (by de￿nition, the elasticities of group 0 are zero) using this calibra-
tion method. For the mobility (resp. participation) elasticity, this is done by simulating
25Con￿dence intervals for elasticities are obtained by repetitive random draws of the preference para-
meters from their estimated distributions and, for each draw, by applying the calibration procedure.
30the proportion of moves from group i to group i ￿ 1 (resp. group 0) in case of a 1% de-
crease in the di⁄erence of disposable income between the two groups. These simulations
require translating individual transitions in terms of work hours into transitions in terms
of gross earnings. Individual transitions are aggregated at the group level to produce
elasticities ￿i and ￿i for each group (see also Blundell et al., 2008). Note that results are
not sensitive to the speci￿cation ￿we have experimented higher polynomial forms for the
deterministic utility function and ￿nd insigni￿cant di⁄erences.
Robustness Analysis
We provide some robustness analysis of the main result, namely that redistributive pref-
erences appear relatively stable over time in Ireland.
Alternative Elasticity Scenarios
In Figure 6 we examine how results may change when high or low elasticity scenarios
are used instead of point estimates. As said in the text, we simply use the bounds of the
95% con￿dence interval for the elasticity in each income group. We focus on 1994 and
2005, the years with the most constrasted results. Social welfare weights are normalized,
i.e., expressed relatively to the weight of group 0, for a more precise comparison. Figure
6 shows that in fact only the drop in the welfare weight of group 1 in 1994 is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent to the situation in the 2000s when the variance of elasticities is taken into ac-
count. Time changes in other parts of the income distribution, and for the two years not
represented in Figure 6, are not signi￿cant. Hence, at ￿rst glance, the result that social
preferences are very stable in Ireland seems robust to some variation on the assumptions
made ￿by the analyst or the social planner ￿about elasticity size.
Alternative Sources to measure Disposable Income
The HBS (and direct information on taxes and bene￿ts) was our primary choice be-
cause of large sample size, representativeness and comparability over time. Yet it seems
reasonable to replicate the analysis using alternative data sources and alternative mea-
sures of disposable income. In Figure 7, we report the patterns of social welfare weights
obtained with three di⁄erent measures of disposable income for the years 1999/2000: di-
rect survey information from the HBS 1999 (our baseline), survey information from the
LII 2000 and microsimulated disposable income (using SWITCH and the LII 2000). Mi-
crosimulated income and HBS income sources provide similar results and hence increase
the con￿dence in the analysis based on reported income in the HBS. At least for our selec-



























































Dashed lines: confidence bounds using + or - 1 s.e. on participation elasticities
elast + 1 S.E.
elast - 1 S.E.
Figure 6: Normalized Social Welfare Weights, Con￿dence Bounds on Elasticities (HBS,






























Simulated incomes - LII and SWITCH
Data incomes - LII
Data incomes - HBS (baseline)
Figure 7: Robustness Check: Varying Data Sources for Disposable Income (year
1999/2000)
tax evasion or misreporting do not seem to matter much. The pattern obtained using
directly survey information from the LII is also close but shows unexpected variations,
which are di¢ cult to explain other than by measurement problems. In Figure 8, we con-
duct the same type of sensitivity analysis on year 2005, using HBS and SILC data. Here
again, the social welfare weights obtained with survey-based disposable income from the
HBS 2005 and microsimulated income using SWITCH and SILC 2005 are very similar.
Income Groups: Alternative Cuto⁄ Points
Finally, we provide a robustness check of the de￿nition of income groups. Naturally,
group 0 remains unchanged. The main issue is how to make these groups comparable
over time. For that purpose, we oppose the baseline de￿nition (groups 1 to 5 are simply
quintiles of the nonzero income distribution) to one where the 1987 quintile-based cuto⁄s
are used in following years after (wage) nominal adjustment.26 Other alternative group
26That i, we "freeze" the quintiles for year 1987 and uprate the cuto⁄ points by the average wage






























Simulated incomes - EU-SILC and SWITCH
Data incomes - EU-SILC
Data incomes - HBS (baseline)
Figure 8: Robustness Check: Varying Data Sources for Disposable Income (year 2005)
34de￿nitions should focus on the crucial role of group 1 (working poor) and re￿ ect the
important tension going on in the optimal tax model between group 0 (workless poor,
living on welfare), group 1 and higher income groups (tax payers). The group of ￿ working
poor￿is central to this redistribution problem because it usually does not receive transfers
nor does it pay taxes. Yet this population is a⁄ected by important ￿nancial disincentives
to work and, as a result, lower social welfare weights. Since ￿ working poor￿is a ill-de￿ned
concept,27 we suggest alternative income group de￿nitions based on di⁄erent de￿nition
of group 1. In the baseline of Table 1, the upper cuto⁄ points on gross income for that
group were EUR 252 and 387 per week in 1999 and 2005 respectively. This corresponds to
around 16% more than a full-time job paid at the minimum wage. In adjusting the upper
cuto⁄ for this group, we alter the proportion of people falling into the "working poor"
category ￿either a smaller group than our baseline, where income is at most a full-time
paid at exactly the minimum wage, or a larger group with this income level plus 30%.28
Upper groups are de￿ned as quantiles of the remaining population.
Results reported in Figure 9 for year 2005 show little variation in all cases. Hence
the analysis seems robust to alternative ways of comparing a discrete income distribution
over time or of capturing the working poor category.
27For instance, it is not clear which poverty line to choose. More fundamentally in our inversion
problem, the view of the social planner may di⁄er from the analyst￿ s.
28An o¢ cial minimum wage was introduced in Ireland in 2000, at EUR 5:6/hour. It reached EUR































cutoffs of 1987 uprated by wage growth
group 1 up to minimum wage + 30%
group 1 at minimum wage
Figure 9: Robustness Check: Varying Cuto⁄ Points for Income Groups (year 2005)
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